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Abstract 
Studies in the behavioral ethics and moral psychology traditions have begun to reveal the 
important roles of self-related processes that underlie moral behavior. Unfortunately, this 
research has resulted in two distinct and opposing streams of findings that are usually referred 
to as moral consistency and moral compensation. Moral consistency research shows that a 
salient self-concept as a moral person promotes moral behavior. Conversely, moral 
compensation research reveals that a salient self-concept as an immoral person promotes 
moral behavior. The present study’s aim was to integrate these two literatures. We argued that 
compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, whereas 
consistency derives from a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. 
Two experiments supported this prediction in showing that cognitive depletion (i.e., resulting 
in a reactive approach) results in moral compensation whereas consistency results when 
cognitive resources are available (i.e., resulting in a proactive approach). Experiment 2 
revealed that these processes originate from reputational (rather than moral) considerations by 
showing that they emerge only under conditions of accountability. It can thus be concluded 
that reputational concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency 
processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a 
reactive or a proactive approach.  
 
 
Keywords: Accountability; Moral compensation; Moral consistency; Moral licensing; Moral 
self-regulation; Prosocial Behavior 
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Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation 
Every day we encounter numerous work situations in which we have to decide 
between right and wrong. In the morning, when choosing a new supplier, a warehouse 
manager may decide to choose for the more expensive one that is guaranteed sweatshop free 
or she may go for the cheapest offer. In the afternoon, she may decide (somewhat more 
trivially) to put in some overtime to finish an important deadline or to enjoy a drink on a 
sunny terrace. Recently, researchers who are interested in behavioral ethics and moral 
psychology have started to study these moment-to-moment balancing acts between prosocial 
and self-interested behavior1. This research has revealed important roles for the self and self-
regulation processes in shaping our moral behaviors (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 
2009; Blasi, 1983; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). 
Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that informs us 
how self-related processes influence moral behavior. In fact, two distinct literatures seem to 
have developed independently. While both literatures rely on similar manipulations and 
measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite findings. On the one hand, a series of 
studies show that people with a salient self-concept as being a moral person display more 
prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient, or for whom an 
immoral self-concept is salient (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 
2007). Thus, this research suggests that when feeling moral (e.g., after helping your colleague 
in the morning), you are more likely to put in some overtime in the afternoon. This effect is 
usually explained in terms of consistency: people who view themselves as moral feel that they 
have to continue acting in a moral manner to avoid violating their sense of self and their 
integrity (Blasi, 1980).  
On the other hand, a growing literature shows that people with a salient self-concept as 
an immoral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is 
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not salient or people who view themselves as moral (e.g., Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 
2011; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Thus, this research suggests, for 
instance, that after procrastinating at work in the morning, you are more likely to 
subsequently comply with a request to work overtime. Conversely, if you would have spent 
your morning helping your colleague, you might refuse to do overtime. This effect is usually 
explained in terms of compensation and licensing processes (Zhong et al., 2009): People who 
feel immoral attempt to “make up” for this by displaying moral behavior (Sachdeva et al., 
2009) whereas people who view themselves as moral feel that they have built up a “surplus” 
of morality, allowing them to display less moral behavior without damaging their self-concept 
and self-presentation as a moral person. 
We know of only one study that has addressed the intriguing inconsistency between 
these two sets of findings. Conway and Peetz (2012) showed that recalling a temporally 
distant action (e.g., behavior performed over 1 year ago) led to moral consistency, whereas 
recalling a recent action (e.g., behavior performed within the past week) led to moral 
compensation effects on prosocial intentions. They argued that this effect occurs because 
distant actions are conceptualized abstractly, in general terms as a schematic representation, 
whereas recent actions are conceptualized concretely, in specific terms as they occurred. 
When people think about (im)moral actions in abstract terms they will focus on the abstract 
moral values associated with these actions and act in line with them. Thinking about 
(im)moral actions in concrete terms might remind people about the moral obligations that they 
already fulfilled, which causes people to feel licensed to act less moral (i.e., when thinking 
about moral behavior) or induces people to compensate through more moral behavior (i.e., 
when thinking about immoral behavior). Yet, when testing this proposition explicitly with 
prosocial behavior as the outcome variable, Conway and Peetz (2012) found evidence for 
moral compensation, but not for moral consistency. 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  5 
 
 
Integrating Moral Consistency and Moral Compensation 
In the present paper, we argue that moral consistency and compensation do not reflect 
mere abstract moral considerations. Instead, they occur in a social context and both processes 
reflect specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. Reputation (i.e., how one is seen by 
others, “others perceptions”; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) is one of the most valuable 
social assets that humans have and they go a long way to build and defend a positive 
reputation (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; James, 1890). We  argue that 
the crucial difference between consistency and compensation is that the former implies a 
proactive focus on maintaining and building a reputation, whereas the latter implies a reactive 
focus on reputation management. Proactivity refers to self-initiated and future oriented 
behavior whereas a reactive focus entails an orientation aimed at responding in the moment 
(Crant, 2000; Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006). 
It has been argued that acting consistent with one’s self-concept and past behavior 
results from an active, long-term outlook on reputation building (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Reed et 
al., 2007). This argument is supported by research showing that consistency may form an 
important long-term reputational cue (Gabarro, 1978; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 
1998) that supports the continuous functioning and development of social relationships 
(Kramer, 1999). Proactivity induces people to focus on the long-term consequences of their 
behavior (Frese, Kring, Soose, & Zempel, 1996; Parker et al., 2006). Moreover, it enables 
people to see the big picture and focus on higher order goals (Ainslie, 1975; Hofmann, Friese, 
& Strack, 2009; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). A proactive focus will thus induce people to 
infer their moral personality from their moral self-concept, which promotes behavior in line 
with this inferred moral personality (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000; Blasi, 1983; Fishbach & Dhar, 
2005). Summarizing, we argue that for moral consistency to occur, people who have a salient 
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self-concept as a moral person assume from this self-concept that they are a moral person, and 
act accordingly to confirm and build their reputation as a moral person.  
Research on moral compensation and licensing, on the other hand, reveals that 
compensation and licensing result from short-term fluctuations in moral self-worth (Khan & 
Dhar, 2007; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This suggest that moral 
compensatory behaviors are likely to be driven by reactive reputational considerations 
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Zhong et al., 2009), rather than proactive 
considerations with a long term outlook aimed at building and maintaining one’s reputation. 
For moral compensation to occur, people have to feel that they need to be prosocial in order to 
defend their threatened reputation. This is likely to occur if people just did something bad 
(which gives them the feeling that they have to make up for their selfish behavior), or 
whenever behavior that is negative for their reputation is salient. Conversely, for moral 
licensing to occur, people should have the impression that the situation allows them to be 
selfish. This is very likely to occur if people just did something good (which provides them a 
free pass to be selfish), or whenever behavior positive for their reputation is salient. Arguably, 
reacting on one’s moral self-concept by “damage control” (i.e., compensation) or by “slacking 
off” (i.e., licensing) is a rather short-term, reactive form of reputation management. 
In sum, we expect that moral consistency and moral compensation both depend on 
reputational considerations. However, moral consistency arguably implies a more proactive 
approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas moral compensation forms a 
reactive, “damage control” response in social situations. 
As an explicit test of our assumption that moral compensation and consistency both 
depend on reputational considerations, we investigated the role of accountability as a 
facilitator of both moral consistency and moral compensation processes. Accountability can 
be defined as people’s expectations that they will be publicly held responsible for their actions 
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(De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Accountability is known to increase 
self-critical awareness of one’s judgment processes, out of concerns of the possible 
reputational consequences of one’s behavior (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
Hence, if our argument holds that moral consistency and compensatory behavior are shaped 
by reputational concerns (i.e., concerns about how one is seen by others), we expect that both 
types of patterns should be found particularly when people are held accountable for their 
actions (i.e., when they have to explain their actions to others). If people are not held 
accountable for their actions, we expect no moral consistency (i.e., because proactive, long-
term reputational concerns are less salient), and no moral compensation (i.e., because a 
reactive, short-term focus on “damage control” in reputation management is unnecessary). 
The Present Studies 
 To test our predictions regarding the subtle processes that flow from people’s dealings 
with reputational concerns, we conducted two laboratory experiments. In both studies, we 
manipulated whether participants had a salient self as a moral versus an immoral person 
relying on an established priming procedure that asks participants to describe and recall a 
situation in which they acted in a moral (versus immoral) manner (see e.g., Aquino et al., 
2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This allowed us to capture moral consistency (i.e., high levels of 
prosocial behavior when a self-definition as moral is salient) as well as moral compensation 
(i.e., or high levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as immoral is salient or low 
levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as moral is salient). Participants were led to 
believe that they worked together with others in a team on several tasks because this has been 
shown to induce reputational concerns (De Cremer & Bakker, 2003; Van Vugt & Hardy, 
2010). 
Scholars have identified a number of factors that make people take a reactive versus a 
proactive approach in their dealing with various challenges. Most importantly, reactive 
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responses are more likely in situations that constrain cognitive capacity (Parker et al., 2006; 
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Cognitive capacity refers to one’s ability to “override or change 
one’s inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies (such as 
impulses) and refrain from acting on them” (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, p. 274). In 
the two experiments presented in this paper, we manipulated the extent to which people take a 
reactive versus proactive approach by relying on a common way to impair cognitive capacity, 
that is, by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). 
People need cognitive resources to override short-term, reactive impulses in order to 
proactively pursue high standards and desirable long-term goals (Baumeister, 2002; Fishbach, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2009; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Mischel, 
1974). When people lack these resources, impulsive behavior that serves immediate, short-
term impulses would predominate, and long-term considerations and goal-directed behavior 
would become impossible (Baumeister, 2005; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; 
Loewenstein, 1996).  
Research indicates that people’s cognitive capacity is a limited resource that can be 
impaired by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister & Haetherton, 
1996; Mischel, Shoda, Rodriguez, 1989; Fishbach et al., 2003). A state of cognitive depletion 
refers to “a temporary reduction in the self’s capacity or willingness to engage in volitional 
action (including controlling the environment, controlling the self, making choices, and 
initiating action) caused by prior exercise of volition” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1253). 
Thus, cognitive depletion hinders the ability to take a proactive approach and strive for long-
term goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that are driven by reactive, short-term 
considerations (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & 
Ariely, 2011). Conversely, non-depleted people should be relatively effective at taking a 
proactive approach (Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Parker et al., 2006). The principal aim of 
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Experiment 1 was to test whether cognitive depletion (i.e., making people act in more reactive 
ways) results in moral compensation whereas sufficient cognitive resources (i.e., not being 
depleted, making people act in more proactive ways) result in moral consistency. 
This focus on a proactive versus a reactive approach to deal with challenges by means 
of manipulating depletion is important as a test of our argument. However, in itself, it does 
not prove conclusively that it is particularly a proactive versus reactive approach towards 
reputation management. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we also wanted to provide an explicit 
and formal test of the idea that moral compensation and consistency result from reputational 
concerns (i.e., concerns about how one is seen by others). In order to do this, we included 
accountability as a factor in our design. Accountability refers to the degree to which one can 
be publicly held responsible for one’s actions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and it is known to 
induce people to act upon reputational concerns (Beu & Buckley, 2001; De Cremer & Van 
Dijk, 2009; Sedikes, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). Hence, reputational concerns should be 
particularly viable in situations where one is accountable for one’s actions. Thus, if moral 
compensation and consistency indeed drive from reputational concerns, then moral 
compensation and consistency effects should be particularly pronounced  in situations of high 
accountability. In situations of low accountability, however, little evidence for compensation 
or consistency effects was expected, because reputational concerns should be less salient in 
these situations. 
 Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-two undergraduate students (62 females, 1 
unreported; Mage = 18.62; SD = .87) participated in this experiment for course credit. They 
were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 
(depletion: low vs. high) between-subjects design.  
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Procedure. We used a procedure designed by Maner and Mead (2010) to measure 
participants’ moral behavior. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in 
separate cubicles that were each equipped with a personal computer. This computer was used 
to collect the participants’ responses and to present the information and stimulus materials to 
the participants. Participants were informed that they would work together with two other 
participants on several tasks. They were led to believe that a computer network was 
established between them and the other team members via which they would collaborate. This 
type of procedure is regularly used in social psychological (e.g., Cornelis, Van Hiel, & De 
Cremer, 2006) and organizational research (e.g., Maner & Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 
2006) to give participants the feeling that they cooperate in a team setting. Next, participants 
were informed that the team assignment required one person to be the leader and the others to 
be subordinates. In reality, all participants were assigned the team leader position, ostensibly 
based on their answers on a ‘leadership ability’ questionnaire they completed before the start 
of the experiment (see e.g., also Hoogervorst, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Mayer, 2012; Maner 
& Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2006 for this leader assignment procedure). They were told 
that it was their task as a team leader to help the team perform optimally.  
Then, to manipulate the moral self-concept, participants were randomly assigned to 
either the moral or the immoral condition. Participants in the moral condition read: “Please 
recall a time when you did something moral in the past.” Participants in the immoral 
condition read: “Please recall a time when you did something immoral in the past.” In the 
moral condition, participants described, for instance, situations in which they honestly gave 
money back that they found or when they opposed a racist group. In the immoral conditions, 
participants described, for instance, situations in which they were unfaithful to their partner, 
or when they stole something. Similar methods have been used in both moral compensation 
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(Jordan et al., 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009), and moral consistency 
studies (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007). 
Subsequently, participants completed the cognitive depletion task (taken from 
Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). As noted, depleting participants’ cognitive resources is a 
common way to impair cognitive capacity, which hinders the ability to focus on and strive for 
long-term goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that are driven by short-term 
considerations (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2011). The cognitive depletion task consists 
of two parts. The first part is designed to form a strong habitual response by the participants. 
The second part taxes the cognitive resources of participants by overriding this habitual 
response (in the cognitive depletion condition) or by continuing the same habitual response 
(in the no depletion condition). Research on self-control indicates that people need cognitive 
resources (which could otherwise be used to take a proactive approach towards one’s goals) to 
break a habitual response (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Thus, for participants 
in the depletion condition, overriding this habitual response is likely to require more cognitive 
resources than for participants in the no depletion condition who do not need to override this 
habitual response. This task has proven successful in manipulating cognitive depletion in a 
number of studies (see Hagger et al., 2010 for an overview). In the first part of the task, 
participants were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter e that they saw in a piece of 
text (i.e., by clicking each e with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback 
whenever they clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding e) and were 
given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase was relatively easy and was used to 
establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every e. In the second part of 
the task, participants either continued identifying the e’s using the same rule as before (i.e., 
the no depletion condition), or they were given the instruction to respond to each e, except 
when the e was followed by a vowel or, when a vowel appeared two letters before the e (i.e., 
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the high depletion condition). After the depletion task, participants were asked to shortly 
recall the moral or immoral behavior they described earlier.  
Then the group task started. This task was used to measure moral behavior (adapted 
from Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants learned that their team should provide as many 
correct solutions to a word puzzle as possible. The total number of correct responses would be 
summed and every correct solution would earn the team points. Participants were told to 
imagine that every point was worth €1, and that the final number of points would be divided 
equally among the team members. However, participants were told that there was also an 
individual bonus for the team member who earned the most points. Next, participants were 
told that they (as the leader) had the possibility to distribute clues among their team members 
that would facilitate solving the puzzle. Clues ranged in quality from 1 (not very helpful) to 7 
(very helpful). Participants were given the following example: “We are looking for the word: 
memory. A level 1 clue would then be: “Ends with a Y.” A level 7 clue would then be: “The 
ability to remember.” Next, participants were asked to enter a single clue level (from 1 to 7) 
for their team members. This task thus allowed us to pit self-interest against prosocial 
behavior. On the one hand, it was the participant’s responsibility as a leader to maximize team 
performance, and giving the best clue possible to their team members would optimize team 
performance. However, giving a low quality clue would increase their own chances of 
winning the individual bonus. Participants thus faced a trade-off between doing the “right 
thing” for the team and focusing on their self-interest. After choosing a clue level, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Manipulation checks. We checked the effectiveness of the cognitive depletion 
manipulation with “The task was habit-breaking” (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and “The 
task was simple” (reversed; taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = 
totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). 
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Two independent judges rated the morality of the recalled behaviors on a 7-point scale 
(1 = immoral; 7 = moral). The interrater reliability was high (Intraclass correlation coefficient 
[ICC] = .85) and ratings were averaged to assess the effectiveness of the moral self-concept 
manipulation. 
  Helping. The dependent variable was the clue level that the leader offered to the team 
(1 = not very helpful; 7 = very helpful). 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using a 2 
(salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA). The results show that, as expected, depleted participants found the depletion task 
more habit-breaking than non-depleted participants (M = 4.64, SD = 1.70 vs. M = 3.48, SD = 
1.34, respectively; F(1, 68) = 9.09, p = .004, 2 = .12), and considered the task as less simple 
than non-depleted participants (M = 5.39, SD = .96 vs. M = 3.68, SD = 1.51, respectively; F(1, 
68) = 27.68, p < .001, 2 = .29). No other main or interaction effects were significant. 
 Furthermore, participants in the moral recall condition described more moral behavior 
than participants in the immoral recall condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.01 vs. M = 2.55, SD = 
1.12, respectively; F(1, 68) = 111.47, p < .001, 2 = .58). No other main or interaction effects 
were significant. 
 These analyses indicate that our manipulations of cognitive depletion (depleted versus 
not depleted) and salient self-concept (i.e., moral versus immoral) were effectively and 
orthogonally induced, allowing us to test our hypotheses regarding the effects of a moral 
versus an immoral self-concept upon helping behavior as a function of the level of cognitive 
depletion. 
 Helping. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. A 2 (salient self-
concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) ANOVA on participants’ helping 
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behavior showed no significant main effect of moral self-concept or cognitive depletion. 
However, the analysis did reveal a significant interaction between cognitive depletion and 
moral self-concept (F(1, 68) = 8.80, p = .004, 2 = .11; see Figure 1). We conducted simple 
effects tests to further analyze this interaction. The results show that among non-depleted 
participants, a salient self-concept as a moral person resulted in more helping than an immoral 
self-concept. However, we found this difference to be only marginal significant (F(1, 68) = 
2.81, p = .098, 2 = .04). In contrast, among depleted participants, a salient self-concept as an 
immoral person led to more helping than a moral self-concept (F(1, 68) = 6.03, p = .017, 2 = 
.09). 
 The results above suggest that we found moral consistency and compensation, but they 
do not inform us about the valence of this behavior. To tentatively assess whether our 
conditions made participants more prosocial or more selfish than the neutral baseline, we ran 
some additional analyses (i.e., One-Sample t-Tests) in which we tested if our participants 
significantly deviated from the midpoint of our helping measure. These analyses reveal that 
non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person helped significantly 
more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(22) = 2.37, p = .027), suggesting more prosocial 
behavior than the baseline. In contrast, non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as 
an immoral person did not differ from this neutral midpoint (t(20) = -0.36, p = .72), indicating 
no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. Furthermore, depleted participants 
with a salient self-concept as a moral person did not differ from the neutral midpoint of our 
scale (t(16) = -1.16, p = .26), indicating no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the 
baseline. In contrast, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person 
helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(10) = 2.62, p = .026), 
indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. 
Summary 
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 Our findings support our predictions. Participants who were not depleted (i.e., 
allowing for a proactive, long-term focus on reputation building) showed moral consistency: 
those recalling moral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling immoral 
behavior. Conversely, participants who were depleted (i.e., making them act more reactively 
upon reputational concerns) showed moral compensation: those recalling immoral behavior 
showed more helping behavior than those recalling moral behavior.  
The conclusions above do tell us when recalling moral behavior results in more 
helping than recalling immoral behavior and vice versa. They do not, however, give us any 
information about whether we are looking at prosocial or at selfish behavior. Additional 
analyses show us that participants who were not depleted helped more when recalling moral 
behavior, but did not help less when recalling immoral behavior relative to the neutral 
baseline. Furthermore, participants who were depleted helped more when recalling immoral 
behavior, but did not help less when recalling moral behavior relative to this neutral baseline. 
This indicates that both a proactive (i.e., no depletion) and a reactive (i.e., depletion) focus are 
able to increase prosocial behavior for participants recalling moral and immoral behavior, 
respectively, but that they do not cause an increase in selfish behavior. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted for two reasons. A first aim was to replicate the findings 
of Experiment 1. Our sample size in Experiment 1 was relatively small and could thus 
potentially have too much inherent variability, which may harm the validity of our findings. 
Experiment 1 showed that people are more likely to act consistent with their moral self-
concept when sufficient cognitive capacity is available, whereas moral compensation prevails 
when cognitive capacity is limited. These findings support our line of reasoning that people 
can deal with reputation management in proactive but also in more reactive ways. Ego 
depletion is a well-established manipulation that makes people act in a more reactive (versus 
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proactive) manner. Yet, showing that a reactive versus proactive approach explains 
compensation versus consistency does not provide prove that moral consistency and 
compensation are driven by reputational concerns. In Experiment 2, we wanted to provide an 
explicit test of the relevance of reputational considerations for the process that we set out to 
study. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we included accountability as a boundary condition. We 
expected that if moral consistency and compensatory behavior are indeed shaped by 
reputational concerns, the effect of cognitive depletion (i.e., moral compensation) versus 
sufficiently available cognitive resources (i.e., moral consistency) should be found 
particularly when people are held accountable for their actions. When people are not 
accountable, reputational concerns do not matter much, leading us to expect little evidence for 
compensation and consistency in these conditions. 
Including accountability as an additional moderator in our design also introduces a 
useful set of control conditions. We expect that unaccountable participants are not influenced 
by reputational concerns. That is, their anonymity will make it more likely that they will not 
worry about the potential consequences of their behavior for their reputation. As such, 
unaccountable participants provide us with a baseline of helping behavior (i.e., that is not 
influenced by any reputational concerns). This baseline then allows us to test whether 
consistency is driven particularly by people who want to act consistent with their salient 
moral self, or (also) by people who want to act consistent with their salient immoral self. For 
compensation processes, these baseline conditions allow us to test whether reactive people are 
likely to compensate for a lack of morality, and / or whether they are also likely to feel 
licensed to act in less moral ways whey they feel moral. 
Because of our explicit focus on the role of accountability in Study 2, we changed one 
aspect of the procedure. As part of the procedure taken from Maner and Mead (2010), we 
assigned all our participants in Experiment 1 as team leaders who were responsible for the 
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optimal performance of the team they were leading. Regretfully, research is unclear about 
how the leadership role relates to accountability. On the one hand, leaders are expected to 
focus on the collective interests and goals (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), and research 
shows that they do so more than regular team members (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006), thus 
suggesting that accountability can be intrinsic to the leadership role. On the other hand, other 
research indicates that at least high power leaders need to be held accountable in order to 
refrain from acting in self-serving ways (Rus, Van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012). Because of 
this unclear state of affairs regarding the relationship between leadership and accountability, 
we assigned all our participants in Experiment 2 to the role of regular team member without 
any reference to the team requiring a leader. This focus on regular team members also makes 
it possible to generalize our findings beyond the leadership role to people who function as part 
of social collectives in general. 
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred and forty-nine undergraduate students (101 
females; Mage = 19.72; SD = 2.52) participated in this study for course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 
(depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. We slightly adapted the procedure used in Experiment 1, such that no 
reference was made to team leaders and all participants were in the role of regular team 
members. After completing the moral self-concept and depletion manipulations, participants 
learned that they were chosen to distribute a clue to their team, which would facilitate solving 
the puzzle. To manipulate accountability, we relied on a common accountability manipulation 
(De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer, & De Rooij, 
2007; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Participants learned that “the clue assignments are 
visible to both the experimenter and the other team members”, or that “the clue assignments 
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are anonymous, both the experimenter and your team members will not know which clue 
assignments you chose”. 
Manipulation checks. We checked the cognitive depletion manipulation with “The 
task was habit-breaking” (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and “The task was difficult” (taken 
from Balliet & Joireman, 2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). To 
check the moral self-concept manipulation, two independent coders rated the recalled 
behaviors on a 7-point scale (1 = immoral; 7 = moral). Interrater reliability was high (ICC = 
.92) and ratings were averaged to form a measure of morality. Additionally, we asked 
participants how they considered the behavior they described on a 7-point scale ranging from 
1 (bad) to 7 (good). 
 Helping. We again used the clue level that participants offered to the team as an index 
of helping behavior (1 = not very helpful; 7 = very helpful). 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using a 2 
(salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low 
vs. high) ANOVA. The results show that depleted participants judged the depletion task as 
more habit-breaking than participants in the no depletion condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.48 vs. 
M = 3.95, SD = 1.64, respectively), F(1, 141) = 12.67, p = .001, 2 = .08. Furthermore, 
depleted participants experienced greater difficulty than non-depleted participants (M = 4.74, 
SD = 1.71 vs. M = 3.70, SD = 1.51, respectively), F(1, 141) = 13.54, p < .001, 2 = .09. No 
other main or interaction effects were significant. 
Participants described more moral behaviors in the moral recall condition than in the 
immoral recall condition (M = 5.60, SD = 0.46 vs. M = 2.55, SD = 0.67, respectively), F(1, 
141) = 1027.01, p < .001, 2 = .85. Additionally, participants in the moral recall condition 
rated their own behavior as more ‘good’ than participants in the immoral recall condition (M 
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= 6.18, SD = .75 vs. M = 2.53, SD = 1.11, respectively), F(1, 141) = 528.54, p < .001, 2 = 
.77. No other main or interaction effects were significant. 
Helping. Means and standard deviations for each condition are presented in Table 2. 
A 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: 
low vs. high) ANOVA on participants’ helping behavior revealed a significant main effect of 
accountability (F(1, 141) = 5.64, p = .019, 2 = .04). Not surprisingly, accountable 
participants helped more than non-accountable participants (M = 4.50, SD = 1.81 vs. M = 
3.75, SD = 2.04, respectively). More importantly, and analogous to Experiment 1, a 
significant interaction emerged between depletion and moral self-concept (F(1, 141) = 5.20, p 
= .024, 2 = .03). This interaction was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction (F(1, 
141) = 4.02, p = .047, 2 = .03).  
For non-accountable participants, the interaction between depletion and moral self-
concept was non-significant (F(1, 79) = 0.04, p = .85, 2 = .00; see Figure 2). Simple effects 
tests showed that non-accountable participants with a moral self-concept did not help more or 
less than non-accountable participants with an immoral self-concept, whether they were 
depleted (F(1, 79) = 0.06, p = .81, 2 = .00), or not (F(1, 79) = 0.00, p = .98, 2 = .00). 
Moreover, One-Sample t-Tests showed that unaccountable participants did not show more or 
less prosocial behavior than the neutral midpoint of our helping scale. Neither for depleted 
participants, regardless of whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept (t(17) = -0.85, 
p = .41 vs. t(20) = -0.58, p = .57, respectively), nor for non-depleted participants, regardless of 
whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept (t(19) = -0.33, p = .74 vs. t(23) = -0.45, 
p = .66, respectively). This thus suggests that the midpoint of our scale forms a useful 
baseline for helping behavior. 
For accountable participants, the interaction between cognitive depletion and moral 
self-concept was significant (F(1, 62) = 10.38, p = .002, 2 = .14; see Figure 2). Simple effect 
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tests showed that for accountable participants who were not depleted, a moral self-concept led 
to more helping than an immoral self-concept. However, we found this difference to be only 
marginally significant (F(1, 62) = 3.05, p = .086, 2 = .05).  Moreover, One-sample t-Tests 
showed that accountable, non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral 
person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(19) = 2.27, p = 
.035), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. In contrast, accountable, non-
depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person did not differ from this 
neutral midpoint (t(15) = 0.00, p = 1.00), indicating no increase or decrease in prosocial 
behavior relative to the baseline. 
In contrast, for accountable participants who were depleted, simple effects tests 
showed that an immoral self-concept led to more helping than a moral self-concept (F(1, 62) 
= 7.68, p = .007, 2 = .12). Additional One-Sample t-Tests showed that accountable, depleted 
participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person did not differ from the neutral 
midpoint of our scale (t(15) = -0.82, p = .42), indicating no increase or decrease in prosocial 
behavior relative to the baseline. In contrast, accountable, depleted participants with a salient 
self-concept as an immoral person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our 
scale (t(13) = 3.00, p = .010), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. 
 These results indicate that our effects in the accountable condition are mainly driven 
by the moral condition for participants who are not depleted, and by the immoral condition for 
participants who are depleted. That is, for accountable participants who are not depleted, 
recalling moral behavior increases prosocial behavior relative to the baseline, but recalling 
immoral behavior does not decrease prosocial behavior. In contrast, for accountable 
participants who are depleted, recalling moral behavior does not decrease prosocial behavior 
relative to the baseline, but recalling immoral behavior does increase prosocial behavior. 
Summary 
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Our findings support our predictions. Like in Study 1, participants who were not 
depleted (i.e., taking a proactive approach) showed moral consistency: those recalling moral 
behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling immoral behavior. Yet, this 
effect was only found among accountable participants. Non-depleted participants who were 
not accountable showed no moral consistency, indicating that the proactive approach that 
these participants displayed reflects reputational concerns. Depleted participants (i.e., taking a 
reactive approach) showed moral compensation: those recalling immoral behavior showed 
more helping behavior than those recalling moral behavior. Yet, again, this compensation 
effect was also restricted to accountable participants. This indicates that moral compensation 
also derives from reputational concerns, but this time of a reactive kind. 
As expected, participants who were not accountable did not show moral consistency or 
compensation effects at all. In fact, their responses never significantly differed from the 
neutral scale midpoint. Accountable participants, on the other hand, showed more helping 
behavior than this neutral baseline in two conditions: when focusing on proactive, long-term 
reputational considerations (i.e., no depletion) and feeling moral (i.e., moral consistency), and 
when focusing on reactive, short-term reputational considerations (i.e., depletion) and feeling 
immoral (i.e., moral compensation). In the other two conditions, helping behavior did not 
differ from this baseline. Our results suggest that helping behavior does not decrease in any of 
our accountable conditions, which indicates that our participants do not get less prosocial (vs. 
the baseline in the unaccountable conditions). Thus we do not find any evidence for immoral 
consistency or moral licensing. 
General Discussion 
This research integrates two lines of research on moral self-regulation that have 
generated opposing findings, while relying on similar manipulations and measures of 
morality. On the one hand, people with a salient self-definition as a moral person have been 
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shown to display more moral behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient or 
who view themselves as immoral (i.e., revealing consistency between the self-concept and 
behavior). On the other hand, research shows that people with a salient self-definition as an 
immoral person show more moral behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not 
salient or who view themselves as moral (i.e., revealing moral compensation and licensing). 
We tried to join these two literatures by focusing on which perspective people take: a 
proactive approach (i.e., in this case because they have sufficient cognitive resources at their 
disposal) or a more reactive approach (i.e., in this case because they were cognitively 
depleted). Furthermore, our results indicate that moral consistency and moral compensation 
processes only emerge under conditions of accountability. In the following sections, we 
discuss the implications and limitations of this research. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Our results strongly suggest that whether consistency or compensation prevails is a 
function of the perspective that participants take: whether they take a reactive approach to 
reputation management or a more proactive approach. That is, we argued that moral 
compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, whereas moral 
consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. 
Furthermore, by including accountability as a boundary condition to this effect we provided 
support for an important assumption of our argument. To understand when moral 
compensation or, conversely, consistency will occur, it is important to realize that these 
effects are at least partly driven by reputational concerns, and not only by de-contextualized 
moral considerations. Obviously, this finding is very different from earlier research that tried 
to integrate moral consistency and compensation by using construal level theory (Conway & 
Peetz, 2012). Construal level theory explains how the psychological distance of events can 
influence abstract and concrete thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Distant events are 
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conceptualized in an abstract way, whereas recent events are conceptualized concretely. We 
extent and improve this approach by showing that moral consistency and compensation do not 
reflect mere abstract moral considerations, but that they occur in a social context. 
The claim that compensation and consistency should be considered as occurring in a 
social context is further strengthened by our results for the role of accountability that indicate 
that reputational considerations clearly play a role in both consistency and compensation 
processes. Importantly, both literatures have suggested that reputational concerns are relevant 
to the display of moral behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010; Reed et al., 2007). However, no 
earlier research has integrated moral consistency and moral compensation processes by 
focusing on differences in reputation management. Our results strongly suggest that moral 
compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, whereas moral 
consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. 
Moreover, our research suggests that people can deal with reputation management in 
proactive but also in more reactive ways.  
Our research also provides a fresh perspective on how (lack of) self-control resources 
relates to selfishness. Prior work has often claimed that a lack of resources straightforwardly 
leads to selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & 
Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Research supporting this idea shows that 
depletion can result in less moral behavior (DeWall et al, 2008) and more immoral behavior 
(DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gino et al, 2011; Mead et al, 2009). Yet, 
there is also research showing that morality is not by definition effortful, but some types of 
morality are in fact driven by automatic processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2008). Hence, a lack of cognitive resources does not necessarily lead to immoral 
behavior. It has been shown, for instance, that depletion does not cause selfishness for people 
with internalized moral values (Gino et al., 2011), for people with a clear dispositional 
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prosocial orientation (Balliet & Joireman, 2010), or for people who consumed a glucose drink 
(Gailliot et al., 2007). In fact, research by Zhong (2011) shows that deliberative decision 
making (comparable to a situation where people are not depleted) can lead to more unethical 
behavior than intuitive decision making (i.e., comparable to a situation where people lack 
resources). We argue that a lack of resources hinders the ability to take a proactive approach 
and thus to focus on and strive for long-term goals, causing people to engage in behaviors that 
are driven more by reactive strategies (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2011). This reactive, 
short-term outlook may induce selfish behavior, because it implies a failure to see the long-
term benefits of moral behavior. Yet, at the same time, our findings show that a short-term 
focus may also make people more moral, if they are focused on damage control (i.e., a direct 
response to a salient self-concept as an immoral person). Earlier research studying the effects 
of self-control on moral behavior often focused on variables that were not particularly 
relevant for damage control and reputation management (e.g., presumed undetectable 
cheating).  
We used the term moral compensation to refer to the process by which people with a 
salient self-concept as an immoral person display more pro-social behavior than people with a 
salient self-concept as a moral person. However, this does not tell us whether our results are 
caused by moral compensation (i.e., people who feel immoral compensate by showing more 
moral behavior), by moral licensing (i.e., people who feel moral feel licensed to act less 
moral), or that perhaps both processes are involved. Most prior research remains silent about 
whether their effects reflect  compensation or licensing (see Sachdeva et al., 2009, for a 
noteworthy exception). Importantly, the accountability manipulation in Study 2, besides 
enabling us to test our idea that moral behavior rests on reputational concerns, provides us 
with a baseline condition of helping behavior. Our results indicate that accountable 
participants who feel moral and are not depleted, and those who feel immoral and are depleted 
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are both more helpful than the baseline set by participants in the unaccountable conditions. 
Importantly, however, accountable participants who feel immoral and are not depleted, and 
those who feel moral and are depleted do not show less prosocial behavior (i.e., more selfish 
behavior) than this baseline. A possible reason for this is that consistently behaving selfish 
may be damaging to one’s self-concept and reputation. Therefore, they level to some optimal, 
baseline level of moral behavior. Likewise, moral compensation is arguably sending a much 
more disturbing signal to one’s reputational concerns (i.e., “I am such a bad person, I should 
make up”) than moral licensing (i.e., “I am such a good person, maybe I can slack off now”). 
From a practical perspective, it is important to note that organizations often install 
procedures that make employees (and managers) more accountable in order to decrease 
immoral, selfish, or deviant behaviors (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Petrick & Quinn, 2001). Our 
findings of Study 2 connect well with this idea in showing a main effect of accountability on 
helping behavior. Moreover, in line with some prior work, our research also shows that 
accountability not simply makes people act in more desirable ways (i.e., leading to a main 
effect of accountability on moral behavior, such as the one that we also obtained), but also 
leads to a stronger focus on their own behavior and psychological processes (i.e., leading to 
the three-way interaction that we were primarily interested in in the present study). However, 
our results suggest that accountability only increases prosocial behavior dependent on the 
context. Moreover, in some cases, accountable people may be similarly helpful as 
unaccountable people. Thus it is important that organizations realize that, in some situations, 
making employees more accountable may not be an effective strategy in reducing selfish 
behavior. 
For organizations, it is important to note that strategies aimed at stimulating prosocial 
employee behavior (e.g., stimulating a clear ethical climate or ensuring that managers behave 
in ethical ways; Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 
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2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) will not necessarily lead to more prosocial 
behavior. The present results suggest that when employees take a reactive approach to 
reputational concerns (e.g., while cognitively depleted), feeling moral may not be effective in 
promoting prosocial behavior. Importantly, various causes of cognitive depletion are 
omnipresent in organizations, such as decision-making (Vohs et al., 2008) and lack of sleep 
(Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011). It is thus important to make employees 
aware of this potential subversion. Furthermore, as research has shown that rest can replenish 
cognitive resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000), strategies aimed at stimulating 
morality should preferably be implemented after a period of rest.  
Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
We realize that the external validity of our findings need to be further established, 
because we tested our predictions in a single laboratory context and relied on priming 
procedures and cognitive depletion tasks to manipulate the salience of people’s self-views and 
their proactive versus reactive approach in dealing with reputational concerns. Our primary 
aim was to make a first attempt to arrive at a theoretical integration of two streams of 
behavioral ethics research, which should improve our understanding of the processes that 
shape ethical behavior. However, different methods (e.g., field research) have to be employed 
to assess the robustness and broader implications of our findings (Ellemers, 2013). 
Consequently, a possible avenue for future research lies in combining different research 
methods and employing different ways to manipulate (or measure) a proactive versus reactive 
approach to reputational concerns. It is interesting to note that studies have shown that 
cognitive depletion in a work context can result in more deviant behaviors among employees 
(e.g., Barnes et al., 2011). Furthermore, research also clearly indicates that people’s salient 
self-concept regarding their morality influences their behavior in organizational contexts (see 
Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008 for an overview).  
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In this respect it is also important to note that the sample sizes in both Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 are relatively small and that this could potentially harm the validity of our 
results. We did however replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in Experiment 2, which 
reinforces the reliability and validity of our results. However, even though we believe that our 
results are valid and reliable, replications in different settings are necessary to further prove 
the validity of our findings. 
We relied on a well-established regulatory depletion manipulation as a way to 
stimulate people to take a reactive versus proactive approach to reputation management. Our 
reliance on this manipulation should not be taken as a suggestion that in prior research that 
revealed moral compensation or licensing effects participants were always ego depleted. 
Regulatory depletion is just one way to make participants take a reactive approach and it is 
likely that other elements of the procedure of a study can induce such a focus. Furthermore, 
there are also stable individual differences between people in the extent to which they are able 
to take a more proactive approach to reputation management (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). 
Future research should test explicitly for the relevance of various individual and situational 
factors that induce a proactive versus reactive approach in understanding consistency and 
compensation effects in moral decision making and action. 
Future research may also focus on potential mediating variables that explain in greater 
detail the emergence of moral consistency and moral compensation. In this research, we 
decided to take a moderator approach because we were particularly interested in testing the 
idea that reputational concerns explain why people compensate or are consistent with their 
moral values. A moderator approach (i.e., focusing on theoretically relevant boundary 
conditions to an effect) is just as valid as a mediator approach (i.e., focusing on theoretically 
relevant intervening variables of an effect) to study processes underlying an effect (see e.g., 
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). A promising avenue for future research would be to focus on 
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the type of reputational concerns (i.e., proactive, long-term versus reactive) as a possible 
underlying process that plays a role in the emergence of both moral consistency and moral 
compensation. 
One limitation of this research that should be mentioned is the skewed gender 
distribution in our samples. The majority of our participants were female, which may pose 
potential problems to the validity of our results. Common belief is that women are less selfish 
than men (Balliet, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011; Eckel & Grossman, 1998). Since our task 
was designed to foster helping behavior among team members, it could be that the specific 
characteristics in our task favored female helping. However, we expect that a general 
tendency for women to help does not affect the validity of our conclusions. That is, we expect 
no gender differences in moral consistency or moral compensation. Thus, a general tendency 
to help does not explain variations in helping behavior among people with a salient self-
concept as a moral or immoral person. It is in this respect noteworthy that (to our knowledge) 
previous studies investigating moral consistency or moral compensation with more balanced 
samples in terms of gender did not report gender effects. 
A final relevant issue to be discussed here is that the results of both Study 1 and Study 
2 suggest that compensation effects are more robust and easier to detect than consistency 
effects. One reason for this may be found in our procedure. The teams in our study were 
newly formed which might curb long-term reputation management concerns. Yet, this focus 
does not limit generalizations that can be inferred from the present research, because many 
encounters in economic and business settings are with people with whom we have weak, 
rather than strong relationships (Granovetter, 1995; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006) In 
fact, in line with our findings, it has been noted that a proactive, long-term focus to reputation 
management may be present in newly formed relationships (Kim et al., 2006; Meyerson, 
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Weick, & Kramer, 1996). However, future research should address whether consistency 
effects are stronger and easier to detect in longer functioning groups and teams. 
Concluding Remarks 
The present research integrates two seemingly opposing literatures. Research on moral 
compensation shows that people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person show more 
prosocial behavior than people with a salient self-concept as a moral person. Conversely, 
research on moral consistency indicates that people with a salient self-concept as a moral 
person show more prosocial behavior than people with a salient self-concept as an immoral 
person. We integrate these two literatures by focusing on differences in reputation 
management. Our results strongly suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, “damage 
control” response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive 
approach to reputation building and maintenance. It thus seems that reputational concerns are 
important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that which of 
these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive or a proactive 
approach.  
  
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  30 
 
 
References 
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse 
control. Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 463-496. doi:10.1037/h0076860 
Albarracín, D., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (2000). The cognitive impact of past behavior: Influences 
on beliefs, attitudes, and future behavioral decisions. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 79(1), 5-22. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.1.5 
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a Social-
Cognitive Model of Moral Behavior: The Interactive Influence of Situations and 
Moral Identity Centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 123-
141. doi:10.1037/A0015406 
Balliet, D., & Joireman, J. (2010). Ego depletion reduces proselfs' concern with the well-
being of others. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13(2), 227-239. 
doi:10.1177/1368430209353634 
Balliet, D., Li, N. P., Macfarlan, S. J., Van Vugt, M. (2011). Sex differences in cooperation: A 
meta-analytic review of social dilemmas. Psychological Bulletin, 137(6), 881-909. 
doi:10.1037/a0025354 
Barnes, C. M., Schaubroeck, J., Huth, M., & Ghumman, S. (2011). Lack of sleep and 
unethical conduct. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 
169-180. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.009 
Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Yielding to temptation: Self-control failure, impulsive purchasing, 
and consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, 28(4), 670-676.  
doi: 10.1086/338209 
Baumeister, R. F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life. New  
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  31 
 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the 
active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 
1252-1265. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
Baumeister, R. F. & Exline, J. J. (1999). Virtue, personality, and social relations: Self-control 
as the moral muscle. Journal of Personality, 67(6), 1165-1194.  
doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00086 
Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview.  
Psychological Inquiry, 7(1), 1-15. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0701_1 
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego depletion: A resource model of  
volition, self-regulation, and controlled processing. Social Cognition, 18(2), 130-150. 
doi:10.1521/soco.2000.18.2.130 
Beu, D., & Buckley, M. R. (2001). The hypothesized relationship between accountability and 
ethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 34(1), 57-73. 
doi:10.1023/A:1011957832141 
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action - a Critical-Review of the 
Literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88(1), 1-45. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.88.1.1 
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral Cognition and Moral Action - a Theoretical Perspective. 
Developmental Review, 3(2), 178-210. doi:10.1016/0273-2297(83)90029-1 
Carlson, E. N., Vazire, S., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2011). You probably think this paper’s about 
you: Narcissists’ perceptions of their personality and reputation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101(1), 185-201. doi:10.1037/a0023781 
Cheek, J. M., & Briggs, S. R. (1982). Self-consciousness and aspects of identity. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 16, 401-408. doi:10.1016/0092-6566(82)90001-0 
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). When Does Feeling Moral Actually Make You a Better 
Person? Conceptual Abstraction Moderates Whether Past Moral Deeds Motivate 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  32 
 
 
Consistency or Compensatory Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
38(7), 907-919. doi:10.1177/0146167212442394 
Cornelis, I., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (2006). Effects of procedural fairness and leader 
support on interpersonal relationships among group members. Group Dynamics-
Theory Research and Practice, 10(4), 309-328. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.10.4.309 
Crant, J. M. (2000). Proactive behavior in organizations. Journal of Management, 26(3), 435-
462. doi:10.1177/014920630002600304 
De Cremer, D., & Bakker, M. (2003). Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The 
influence of others’ reputational concerns. Current Psychology, 22(2), 155-163. 
doi:10.1007/s12144-003-1006-6 
De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2009). Paying for sanctions in social dilemmas: The effects 
of endowment asymmetry and accountability. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 109(1), 45-55. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.01.004 
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005). Am I respected or not?: Inclusion and reputation as 
issues in group membership. Social Justice Research, 18(2), 121-153. 
doi:10.1007/s11211-005-7366-3 
De Kwaadsteniet, E. W., Van Dijk, E., Wit, A., De Cremer, D., & De Rooij, M. (2007). 
Justifying decisions in social dilemmas: Justification pressures and tacit coordination 
under environmental uncertainty. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(12), 
1648-1660. doi:10.1177/0146167207307490 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. (2008). Depletion Makes 
the Heart Grow Less Helpful: Helping as a Function of Self-Regulatory Energy and 
Genetic Relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(12), 1653-1662. 
doi:10.1177/0146167208323981 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T. F., & Gailliot, M. T. (2007). Violence  
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  33 
 
 
restrained: Effects of self-regulation and its depletion on aggression. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 62-76. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.12.005 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998). Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence from  
dictator experiments. The Economic Journal, 108, 726-735.  
doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00311 
Ellemers, N. (2013). Connecting the dots: Mobilizing theory to reveal the big picture in social 
psychology (and why we should do this). European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 
1-8. doi:10.1002/ejsp.1932 
Fishbach, A., & Dhar, R. (2005). Goals as excuses or guides: The liberating effect of 
perceived goal progress on choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(3), 370-377. 
doi:10.1086/497548 
Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not unto temptation: 
Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 84(2), 296-309. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.2.296 
Frese, M., Kring, W., Soose, A., & Zempel, J. (1996). Personal initiative at work: Differences 
between East and West Germany. Academy of Management Journal, 39(1), 37-63. 
doi:10.2307/256630 
Gabarro, J. J. (1978). The development of trust, influence, and expectations. In A. G. Athos & 
J. J. Gabarro (Eds.), Interpersonal behaviors: Communication and understanding in 
relationships (pp. 290-303). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., 
Brewer, L. E., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited 
energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(2), 325-336. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.2.325 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  34 
 
 
Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., Mead, N. L., & Ariely, D. (2011). Unable to resist temptation: 
How self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 191-203. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.03.001 
Granovetter, M. S. (1995). Getting a job : a study of contacts and careers (2nd ed.). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). 
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 
107(3), 1144-1154. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego Depletion and the 
Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136(4), 
495-525. doi:10.1037/A0019486 
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral 
intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98-116. 
doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z 
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems 
perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(2), 162-176. 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01116.x 
Hoogervorst, N., De Cremer, D., Van Dijke, M. H., Mayer, D. M. (2012). When do leaders 
sacrifice?: The effects of sense of power and belongingness on leader self-sacrifice. 
Leadership Quarterly, 23, 883–896. doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2012.05.006 
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt. Retrieved from: 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/ 
Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of 
Recalling Past Moral Actions on Future Moral Behavior. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 37(5), 701-713. doi:10.1177/0146167211400208 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  35 
 
 
Kant, I. (2005). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. Ontario, Canada: Broadview  
Press. (Original work published 1785). 
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2007). Where there is a way, is there a will? The effect of future 
choices on self-control. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 136(2), 277-
288. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.2.277 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is better 
than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust 
after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 99(1), 49-65. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.07.002 
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring 
questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569-598. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.569 
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125(2), 255-275. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255 
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational  
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(3), 272-292. 
doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 
Maner, J. K., & Mead, N. L. (2010). The Essential Tension Between Leadership and Power: 
When Leaders Sacrifice Group Goals for the Sake of Self-Interest. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 99(3), 482-497. doi:10.1037/A0018559 
Martin, K. D., & Cullen, J. B. (2006). Continuities and extensions of ethical climate theory: A 
meta-analytic review. Journal of Business Ethics, 69(2), 175-194. 
doi:10.1007/s10551-006-9084-7 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  36 
 
 
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., Greenbaum, R., Bardes, M., & Salvador, R. (2009). How low does 
ethical leadership flow? Test of a trickle-down model. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 108(1), 1-13. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.04.002 
Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., & Greenbaum, R. L. (2010). Examining the Link Between Ethical 
Leadership and Employee Misconduct: The Mediating Role of Ethical Climate. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 7-16. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0794-0 
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). Do Green Products Make Us Better People? Psychological 
Science, 21(4), 494-498. doi:10.1177/0956797610363538 
Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., & Ariely, D. (2009). Too tired to  
tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45, 594-597. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.004 
Meyerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1996). Swift trust and temporary groups. In R. 
M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and 
research (pp. 166-195). California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Miller, D. T., & Effron, D. A. (2010). Psychological License: When It Is Needed and How It 
Functions. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol 43, 43, 115-155. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(10)43003-8 
Mischel, W (1974). Processes in delay of gratification. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 7, pp. 249-292). New York: Academic Press. 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. 
Science, 244, 933-938. doi:10.1126/science.2658056 
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1), 33-43. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.81.1.33 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  37 
 
 
Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. (1999). Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts to initiate 
workplace change. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4), 403-419. 
doi:10.2307/257011 
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: 
Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 247-259.  
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.2.247 
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation 
processes among powerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
81(4), 549-565. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.81.4.549 
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of 
powerholders' social attention. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 99(2), 227-243. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.003 
Parker, S. K., Bindl, U. K., & Strauss, K. (2010). Making things happen: A model of 
proactive motivation. Journal of Management, 36(4), 827-856. 
doi:10.1177/0149206310363732 
Parker, S. K., Williams, H. M., & Turner, N. (2006). Modeling the antecedents of proactive 
behavior at work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(3), 636-652.  
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.3.636 
Petrick, J. A., & Quinn, J. F. (2001). The challenge of leadership accountability for integrity 
capacity as a strategic asset. Journal of Business Ethics, 34(3-4), 331-343. 
doi:10.1023/A:1012597201948 
Reed, A., Aquino, K., & Levy, E. (2007). Moral identity and judgments of charitable 
behaviors. Journal of Marketing, 71(1), 178-193. doi:10.1509/jmkg.71.1.178 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  38 
 
 
Rus, D., Van Knippenberg, D., & Wisse, B. (2012). Leader power and self-serving behavior: 
The Moderating Role of Accountability. Leadership Quarterly, 23(1), 13-26. 
doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.11.002 
Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). Interdependence, interaction, and 
relationships. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 351-375. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145059 
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: The 
Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation. Psychological Science, 20(4), 523-528. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02326.x 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral 
judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096-1109. 
doi:10.1177/0146167208317771 
Sedikes, C., Herbst, K. C., Hardin, D. P., & Dardis, G. J. (2002). Accountability as a deterrent 
to self-enhancement: The search for mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83(3), 592-605. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.592 
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., & Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012). Honesty requires time (and lack of 
justifications). Psychological Science, 23(10), 1264-1270. 
doi:10.1177/0956797612443835 
Shao, R. D., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). Beyond Moral Reasoning: A Review of 
Moral Identity Research and Its Implications for Business Ethics. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 18(4), 513-540.  
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why 
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining 
psychological processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 845–851. 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  39 
 
 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of 
Personality, 72(2), 271–324. doi:10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x 
Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L., & Boettger, R. (1989). Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping 
with Accountability - Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 57(4), 632-640. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.57.4.632 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal level theory of psychological distance. 
Psychological Review, 117, 440-463. doi:10.1037/a0018963 
Van Vugt, M., & Hardy, C. L. (2010). Cooperation for reputation: Wasteful contributions as 
costly signals in public goods. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13(1), 101-
111. doi:10.1177/1368430209342258 
Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2008). Leadership, followership, and evolution - 
Some lessons from the past. American Psychologist, 63(3), 182-196. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066x.63.3.182 
Vohs, K. D., Schmeichel, B. J., Nelson, N. M., Baumeister, R. F., Twenge, J. M., & Tice, D. 
M. (2008). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: A limited-resource 
account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 94(5), 883-898. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.883 
Whitener, E. M., Brodt, S. E., Korsgaard, M. A., & Werner, J. M. (1998). Managers as 
initiators of trust: An exchange relationship framework for understanding managerial 
trustworthy behavior. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 513-530. 
doi:10.2307/259292 
Wilhelm, M. O., & Bekkers, R. (2010). Helping behavior, dispositional empathic conern, and 
the principle of care. Social Psychology Quarterly, 73(1), 11-32. 
doi:10.1177/0190272510361435 
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  40 
 
 
Zhong, C. (2011). The ethical dangers of deliberative decision making. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 56, 1-25. doi:10.2189/asqu.2011.56.1.001 
Zhong, C., Liljenquist, K., & Cain, D. M. (2009). Moral self-regulation. Licensing and 
compensation. In D. De Cremer (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on ethical behavior 
and decision making (pp. 75-89). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing. 
  
Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation  41 
 
 
Footnotes 
     1Morality requires people to forgo self-interested impulses and focus on the needs of others 
(Kant, 2005/1785; Aquino et al., 2009). In this paper we adopted a focus on prosocial 
behavior, which are actions intended to help other people. Helping behavior is considered an 
important exemplar of moral behavior (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010). 
More specifically, more helping behavior implies less self-interest in our studies. 
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Table 1 
Helping Behavior of Participants as a Function of Cognitive Depletion and Moral Recall 
Condition in Study 1 
  Moral recall condition 
 Moral  Immoral 
Cognitive depletion condition M SD  M SD 
Depletion 3.59a 1.46  5.00b 1.27 
No depletion 4.61a 1.23  3.86b 1.82 
Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each other at p < .05, with the 
exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the no depletion condition, where p = .098.  
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Table 2 
Helping Behavior of Accountable and Non-Accountable Participants as a Function of 
Cognitive Depletion and Moral Recall Condition in Study 2 
   Moral recall 
condition 
  Moral  Immoral 
 Cognitive depletion condition M SD  M SD 
Accountable condition Depletion 3.63a 1.82  5.36b 1.69 
 No depletion 5.00a 1.97  4.00b 1.16 
       
Non-accountable condition Depletion 3.56a 2.23  3.71a 2.26 
 No depletion 3.85a 2.01  3.83a 1.81 
Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each other at p < .05, with the 
exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the no depletion condition, where p = .086.  
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Figure 1. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition in Study 1 
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Figure 2. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition for 
accountable and non-accountable participants in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
